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Marietta Radomska  
 
Towards a Posthuman Collective
1: Ontology, Epistemology and Ethics 
 
 
“[...] we know because »we« are of the world. 
We are part of the world in its differential 
becoming.” 
2 
 
“We are all matter, and we all matter.”
3 
 
Introduction. Basic Distinctions 
 
The times we live in require adequate accounts. We have always been entangled in 
various relation(ship)s with nonhumans – animal, earth and technological ones. Twentieth and 
twenty first centuries ecological devastation has brought environmental issues, having their 
own spokespersons, into the political arena. The rapid development of advanced technologies 
makes us realise that agency might not be only about human subjectivity and autonomy. The 
nature/culture dichotomy is no longer valid. In fact, it has never been. We live in a collective 
of humans and nonhumans, as Bruno Latour suggests. The belief in the autonomous, rational 
human subject seems irrelevant, as the centre has already been decentred. Sometimes we hear 
that  we  are  living  in  a  posthuman  world.  I  am  ultimately  far  from    neo-liberal  seers, 
foretelling the end of history and the last man, such as Francis Fukuyama, as well as from 
futurists such as Ray Kurzweil. Instead, I would like to pose the question of a posthuman 
collective. How to think adequately such a “community” of humans and nonhumans? Is it 
possible to think a posthuman(ist) politics? How? These enquiries are becoming increasingly 
urgent. Yet, in order to attempt to give an answer, first one has to define precisely what kind 
of tools one is going to use. I would like to suggest that posthumanist theory is an excellent 
and relevant tool for this task. In this article I will formulate the basic premises of my account 
                                                 
1 I employ the Latourian term  “collective” (understood as a “procedure of collecting associations of humans and 
nonhumans” – B. Latour,  Politics of Nature, trans. C. Porter, Harvard  2004,  p. 238)  instead of “community” 
or “society” because I think these notions are specifically entangled in the humanist discourse. However, in the 
Polish translation of the title I do use the term “wspólnota” (community, commonwealth) for two reasons: (1) it 
appears to be the most appropriate out of the possible alternatives, and (2) the anthropocentric burden in the 
Polish translation of this term is less visible (due to the above-mentioned alternative terms). 
2 K. Barad, Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter, “Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society” 2003, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 829. 
3 L. Birke, M. Bryld, N. Lykke, Animal Performances: An Exploration of Intersections between Feminist Science 
Studies and Studies of Human/Animal Relationships,  “Feminist Theory” 2004, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 178. Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
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of posthumanist theory (or the “posthumanist tool” as I like to call it). Only by conducting 
such meticulous analysis and mapping all the components of this tool, one will be able to 
proceed to think the collective and its politics.  
The notion of posthumanism traces back to the late 1960s. As Manuela Rossini
4 points 
out, it was mainly associated with Friedrich Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God 
and Martin Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism. What followed was the most explicit expression 
of the debate over the end of humanism, namely Michel Foucault’s famous statement closing 
his book The Order of Things: “[...] man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the 
edge of the sea.”
5. Posthumanism has been placed alongside and considered as a companion 
to postmodernist and poststructuralist currents of thought, being at the same time defined as a 
specific carrier of “helplessness”
6.  
However,  defining  posthumanism  is  not  as  simple  and  unproblematic  as  one  may 
assume. Even if we agree on its basic premises, such as: overcoming humanism (or rather 
humanist anthropocentrism
7), taking into account nonhuman (animal or technological) others, 
a  specific  affirmation  of  difference
8,  we  have  to  encounter  a  number  of  notions  used 
interchangeably with “posthumanism” (not to mention its various, sometimes contradictory or 
at  least  incompatible  characteristics).  Among  the  most  significant  of  these  terms  are: 
transhumanism,  cybernetic  posthumanism,  critical  posthumanism,  metaposthumanism, 
antihumanism. What Rossini suggests as a basic definition and beginning of posthumanism, 
namely  the  one  directly  related  to  Foucault’s  death  of  man  or  Jean-François  Lyotard’s 
“inhuman” (which I cannot draw upon in this article due to limited space), I would rather call 
“antihumanism”,  using  the  Althusserian  term  that  remains  inscribed  in  structuralist, 
poststructuralist and postmodernist theories. Doubtless, it has been an important attempt of 
decentring  the  subject,  the  One,  the  Same,  as  well  as  pointing  out  the  lack  of  human’s 
autonomy and agency. Although “posthumanism” that I want to discuss in this text has its 
origins in those movements and theories, I would understand it as a current of thought coming 
“after” postmodernism, even if deeply rooted in it, as a theory not only overcoming humanist, 
but also anthropocentric premises, and paying much more attention to nonhuman others.  
                                                 
4 M. Rossini, To the Dogs: Companion Speciesism and the New Feminist Materialism, “Kritikos” 2006, Vol. 3, 
http://intertheory.org/rossini  [2.01.2010]. 
5 M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences, New York 1994, p. 387. 
6 As stated by literary critic Ihab Hassan in: Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture? A 
University Masque in Five Scenes, “Georgia Review” 1977, Vol. 31, No. 4, p. 830-850, according to Rossini, To 
the Dogs... 
7 At this point „overcoming anthropocentrism” is not so clear, and to be precise, it cannot be associated with 
every  branch of “posthumanism”. I will explain it in further parts of this paper. 
8 Again, I use a  simplification and a generalisation here, which I will explain later. www.praktykateoretyczna.pl 
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In a common understanding, the notion of posthumanism is often associated with the 
hype  narrative  on  the  scientific,  technological  and  cultural  progress,  leading  “from 
hierarchical differentiation in traditional humanism [...] to at least the possibility and »active 
utopia« of non-hierarchical difference in posthumanism”
9. In this sense, the latter connotes  a 
life which is no longer dependent on the biological, material embodiment; the human body is 
treated there as  “a prosthesis and can  be extended and  its parts replaced ad infinitum”
10, 
constantly being enhanced. Such a perspective is directly connected to Norbert Wiener’s idea 
of cybernetics with intelligent machines taken as “»natural« descendants of homo sapiens”
11. 
Those ideas were flourishing during the second-world-war and especially after-war periods of 
insecurity and tensions, when bringing back order and stability was at stake. As Rossini points 
out,  N.  Katherine  Hayles  even  uses  the  term  of  “cybernetic  posthumanism”  in  order  to 
demonstrate the common  line of thought between  Wiener’s cybernetics and posthumanist 
ideas of technological, prosthetic and neuropharmacological enhancement of the human body 
as well as, what follows, theory-of-information-driven disembodiment. Furthermore, one may 
find  precisely  these  themes  in  the  Swedish  philosopher,  Nick  Bostrom’s  project  of 
transhumanism
12 treating transformation technologies as a sort of deepening the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment tradition of developing and perfecting the human capacities (both mental 
and  physical  in  this  case)  via  different  (technological)  means.  The  latter  are  to  be  e.g. 
genetical  pre-programming  aiming  at  “superhappiness,  superlongevity  and 
superintelligence”
13,  psychopharmacology,  prosthetics,  consciousness  uploading
14,  etc. 
Transhumanist  movement  appears  to  be  quite  variable  within  itself,  comprising  different 
political  perspectives:  from  the  (neo)liberal  to  the  leftist,  and  different  fields:  from 
philosophy, through hard sciences to art. Among other well-known names associated with 
                                                 
9 M. Rossini, To the Dogs... 
10 Ibidem. 
11 Ibidem. 
12  See  Nick  Bostrom’s  website:  http://www.nickbostrom.com/  [2.01.2010],  especially  his  articles:  What  is 
Transhumanism?  (first  published  in  1998  and  reviewed  in  2001,  also  on  the  website: 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/old/transhumanism.html) and A History of Transhumanist Thought (published in 
2005  in  “Journal  of  Evolution  and  Technology”,  Vol.  14,  No.  1,  also 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/history.pdf).  In  1998  with  David    Pearce  he  co-founded  World 
Transhumanist Association, which later evolved into Humanity +; in 2004 together with James Hughes, Bostrom 
launched the Institute for Ethics and emerging Technologies.   
13 As Bostrom’s colleague, David Pearce, claims in the interview with both: Pearce and Bostrom to be found on 
the  website:  http://sexgenderbody.com/content/interview-nick-bostrom-and-david-pearce-about-transhumanism 
[2.01.2010]. 
14 Transhumanists claim that one of the future possibilities of prolonging human life will be by uploading one’s 
consciousness on a special computer. Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
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transhumanism (and futurism at the same time), one may point out Hans Moravec
15, Ray 
Kurzweil
16  or  Natasha  Vitamore
17.  Although  such  projects  contribute  to  fragmentation  or 
even  deconstruction  of  traditionally  understood  humanism  with  its  vision  of  autonomous 
human subject, as Rossini suggests
18, in fact they just continue, reinforce and reinscribe the 
Cartesian schema of thought. Even if transhumanist thinkers and theorists speak about the 
necessity  of  the  preservation  and  protection  of  environment,  as  it  is  mentioned  e.g.  in 
Transhumanist Declaration
19, they still treat these issues as means for human’s own well-
being.  Therefore,  the  logic,  which  I  would  call  speciesist,  remains  the  same.  Although 
deconstructed and reconfigured, it is the human nature and humanity which are at stake, and 
which are cared  about. In addition, the transhumanist  narrative about disembodiment and 
“post-biological future”
20 surprisingly evokes a Christian vision of the eternal life. 
Taking into consideration all of the above characteristics, I would like to make clear 
some  necessary  distinctions.  In  other  words,  I  would  like  to  reserve  the  notion  of 
“transhumanism” to all those currents of thought that claim the overcoming or pushing further 
the Enlightenment humanism, while focusing on the human subject and her/his well-being 
and  enhancement.  Such  naming  would  be  also  in  accordance  with  the  emphasis  on 
transformation technologies among transhumanist theorists, and on the other hand with the 
rise of the institutions using “transhumanism” as their label. Concomitantly, I would use the 
name of “posthumanism” to call quite different lines of thought.  
Rossini  in  her  article  “To  the  Dogs:  Companion  Speciesism  and  New  Feminist 
Materialism” mentions “critical posthumanism” and “metaposthumanism” (which in actual 
fact mean almost the same thing) as theories taking “a critically-distanced stance and not a 
totalising one”
21 towards the excitement of the above-discussed futurist ideas. Nevertheless, 
as Rossini points out, they still remain entangled in the liberal (speciesist) ideals. That is why 
in  this  article  (as  in  my  other  articles  treating  these  issues),  I  will  use  the  notion  of 
“posthumanism” to call such theories and stances which not only go beyond humanism, but 
                                                 
15 Moravec’s website at Robotics Institute of Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh (USA), where he works 
as an adjunct faculty member: http://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/ [2.01.2010]. 
16 Official Kurzweil’s website: http://bigthink.com/raykurzweil [2.01.2010]. 
17 Media artist, transhumanism lecturer and director of H+ Lab for scientific and artistic collaborations; her 
personal website: http://natasha.cc/ [2.01.2010]. 
18 M. Rossini, To the Dogs... 
19 Point 7 of this declaration says: „We advocate the well-being of all sentience, including humans, non-human 
animals, and any future artificial intellects, modified life forms, or other intelligences to which technological and 
scientific  advance  may  give  rise.”  –  to  be  found  on  the  website: 
http://humanityplus.org/learn/philosophy/transhumanist-declaration [2.01.2010]. 
20 M. Rossini, To the Dogs... 
21 Ibidem. www.praktykateoretyczna.pl 
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also overcome anthropocentrism, which has always been a humanistic core. In this sense, 
transhumanist  claims  just  miss  the  posthumanist  point  due  to  the  fact  of  being  utterly 
anthropocentric (even when they seem to care about the environment).  
Having  made  the  essential  distinctions  between  the  terms  and  formulated  basic 
definitions, I would like to argue that the posthumanist theory is an essential, important and 
very productive tool that may be used to account for human and nonhuman relations and 
interactions
22. Birke, Bryld and Lykke
23 provide the evidence for how Barad’s concept of 
“posthuman  performativity”  can  bring  benefits  for  thinking  and  examining  human  and 
nonhuman animal relationships. Moreover, they demonstrate in what way feminist science 
studies (and feminist theory in general) and animal studies intersect, and how important it is 
to  explore  this  intersection.  This  can  be  achieved  by  using  the  posthumanist  tool. 
Nevertheless,  in order to operate this tool,  first one  has to examine  and define the  basic 
components  of  posthumanist  theory.  In  this  article,  I  would  like  to  suggest  four  threads 
composing posthumanist theory. The first one, modes of being, treats the issue of ontology, or 
rather  its  reformulation;  the  second  one,  modes  of  knowing,  touches  epistemology,  and 
precisely the entwinement between ontology, epistemology and ethics. The third and fourth 
threads concern the question of subject and its formation. Strictly speaking, the third one 
gives the account of matter, and the fourth and last one – of alliances.  
In  this  connection,  I  will  start  my  reconstruction  of  the  posthumanist  theory  by 
drawing upon the ontology which composes its basis, while taking into account the context of 
feminist theory (the ontology of sexual difference). Then I will proceed to the analysis of the 
relation between  ontology, epistemology and ethics, or namely, their entwinement. In the 
third section of this paper I will focus on the formation of subject through the consideration of 
the concepts of matter and alliances. 
It is only by undergoing such a meticulous analysis, by doing such a mapping and 
defining the precise components of the posthumanist tool that one will be able to think the 
posthuman collective as well as imagine the posthuman politics. 
 
Modes of being. Ontology 
 
 
In this section I will focus on two theoretical propositions, which, on the one hand, 
converge with each other in an excellent way, and give an account of different aspects of the  
                                                 
22 Following Barad, I will problematise this notion in the main body of this text. 
23 L. Birke, M. Bryld, N. Lykke, Animal performances... Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
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posthumanist (more “fundamental”?) ontology, on the other. I will start with Jami Weinstein’s 
proposition of transspecies zoontology, the logic of which appears to be the result of “pushing 
to  the  limit”
24  the  logic  of  sexual  difference,  and  in  this  way  truly  deconstructing 
Enlightenment Humanism structured according to the logic of Sameness. Her project, being 
highly inspired by the Deleuzian line of thought, engages in a dialogue with Luce Irigaray’s 
take on a fundamental ontology and proposes an alternative, which is no longer haunted by 
the spectre of anthropocentrism. Subsequently, I will draw upon Karen Barad’s concept of 
agential realist ontology (being related to Bohr’s philosophy-physics, as Barad demonstrates 
it),  which,  according  to  her,  forms  the  basis  for  the  formation  of  subject.  Finally,  I  will 
attempt to point out the resonances between these two projects, what will enable me to pass to 
the issue of entwinement between ontology, epistemology and ethics. 
 
Transspecies zoontology 
 
The project of transspecies zoontology, a truly fundamental ontology, which in actual 
fact eschews the trap of Enlightenment Humanism, and thus its intrinsic anthropocentrism, 
emerges,  as  Weinstein  suggests,  from  the  intersection  of  feminist  theory  and  Deleuzian 
thought. Both Weinstein and Colebrook, to whom she refers, follow Deleuze in their treating 
of a concept as always related to a problem, since “concepts are only created as a function of 
problems”
25. Moreover, for Deleuze and Guattari concepts are “centres of vibrations”
26; a 
philosophical concept is “the configuration, the constellation of an event to come”
27. In other 
words,  philosophical  concepts  with  their  related  problems  already  contain  (virtually)  in 
themselves a possibility to think them through and move further, to “push [them] to the limit” 
and go beyond them. Although it seems quite abstract, it is precisely what happens when 
Weinstein engages in her article with the concept of sexual difference, its logic and ontology 
in order to create “new concepts, new questions and new problems [...] enabling new events 
[...] and new possibilities”
28. This situation enables her to undo sexual difference and “move 
to zoontology”
29. Here I will attempt to reconstruct her argument. 
                                                 
24 In a Deleuzian sense. 
25 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. H. Tomlinson, G. Burchell, New York 1994, p. 16. 
26 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 23, [cited in:] J. Weinstein, Introduction Part II, “Deleuze 
and Gender. Deleuze Studies” 2008, p. 20-33, p. 23. 
27 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 32-33 [cited in:] J. Weinstein, Introduction...,  p.23. 
28 C. Colebrook, Is Sexual Difference a Problem? [in:] Deleuze and Feminist Theory, ed. C. Colebrook, I. 
Buchanan,. Edinburgh 2000, p. 114. 
29 J. Weinstein, Introduction..., p. 26. www.praktykateoretyczna.pl 
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  As I suggested earlier, sexual difference is treated here as a concept and a problem in a 
Deleuzian sense. As  Weinstein refers to Deleuze and Guattari,  if  “a concept is unable to 
constitute itself, it is likely the result of it being mired in other problems”; this means that a 
concept “evokes an event that helps create future concepts to better resolve the problems to 
which it was originally linked”
30. An event to come in a case of sexual difference, according 
to  Irigaray  and  other  advocates  of  sexual  difference  theory,  is  “the  materialisation  of  a 
fundamental  ontology  of  sexual  difference,  the  coming  into  existence  of  the  subject 
woman”
31. Nevertheless, the inabilility of sexual difference (with its fundamental ontology) to 
materialise  is  inherently  related  to  the  problem  of  humanism,  and  precisely  its  intrinsic 
anthropocentrism, as Weinstein argues. Moreover, a concept in that sense is always about a 
logic
32.  
  Ontology  in  a  traditional  sense  has  always  been  about  the  One,  monadic  and 
“fundamentally singular”
33 – no matter if in a version of ancient Greek philosophers, or in a 
Heideggerian  project  of  a  fundamental  ontology.  In  fact  it  has  been  a  patriarchal  and 
phallocentric model according to which everything was structured. That is why language, all 
forms of knowledge, science, representation as well as other symbolic, social and economic 
structures are coded as masculine, where woman remains as untheorised lack
34. What Irigaray 
proposes (and what is the basis for sexual difference theory) is her version of a fundamental 
ontology, that is the ontology of (at least) Two – “where woman and man are irreducible 
others”
35. Nonetheless, though such an ontology appears to be an invaluable step forward, it is 
only a first step to acknowledge what it means “to be a human”, and furthermore, “to become 
human”, as Weinstein argues. I would even say: what it means “to become”, without this 
literal  reference  to  human.  Due  to  space  limits,  alas,  I  cannot  invoke  here  Weinstein’s 
argumentation at  full  length. Yet, what she suggests,  is to undo sexual difference  not by 
returning to the One (or the Same) of the traditional account of ontology, but by “a repetition 
of pure difference”. The latter means that first we have to understand sexual difference, go 
through it (pushing it to the limit) in order to arrive at an ontology which would be truly 
fundamental,  that  is  no  longer  anthropocentric.  The  solution  appears  to  be the  Deleuzian 
ontology and politics of imperceptibility that may be virtually found in the concepts of sexual 
                                                 
30 Ibidem, p. 23. 
31 Ibidem. 
32 Ibidem. 
33 Ibidem, p. 24. 
34 It is explicitly visualised by Jacques Lacan’s diagramme of sexual difference; the website briefly explaining 
the diagramme: http://nosubject.com/Formulae_of_sexuation [2.01.2010]. 
35 J. Weinstein, Introduction..., p. 24. Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
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difference  and  becoming-woman.  In  other  words,  what  needs  to  be  done  is  a 
“deterritorialisation of the human”
36. 
  If we stop  at the ontology of sexual difference, the logic of the One starts to work 
again in some sense. Namely, in regard to the issue of animality, even if we acknowledge 
sexual difference in its fundamental and fixed form, it is the nonhuman (as opposed to the 
human) that appears as an untheorised lack. Thus man/woman indifference characteristic to 
the logic of the One (and Enlightenment Humanism) is just transposed to another level: a 
human/nonhuman  animal  indifference
37.  Moreover,  in  a  commonly  accepted  binary 
opposition: human – animal, the notion of “the animal” (or as Derrida presents this problem: 
the general singular of  “the Animal”
38) appears to cover the whole multiplicity of different 
species and in this way is simply speciesist. The multiplicity of humans (recognised through 
the theory of sexual difference) as opposed to the multiplicity of animals cannot be reduced to 
the opposition of singular human versus singular animal.  
  That is precisely why the Deleuzian “fluid multiple” ontology brings an indispensable 
solution.  Furthermore, for Deleuze  and Guattari  “becoming and  multiplicity are the same 
thing”
39. Whereas in sexual difference theory one may find visible traces of “being”
40, of 
fixed entities and a sort of teleological thinking, Deleuzian and Guattarian  “becoming”  is 
about a movement, a process, about “a middle”. Becoming other does not mean becoming 
another  “pure  entity”,  but  utterly  “becoming  imperceptible”.  In  a  Deleuzian  perspective, 
difference is always “pure”, it is “shown differing”. To put it more simply, the Deleuzian 
difference  is  not  defined  with  regard  to  an  identity;  it  is  a  pure  difference  in  itself,  not 
formulated in any opposition. It is in this field of the pure difference that we may think of and 
move toward a fundamental transspecies zoontology, as Weinstein suggests. Consequently, 
such  an  ontology  genuinely  faces  and  deconstructs  the  anthropocentric  humanism  still 
underlying sexual difference theory. Furthermore, it is more adequate, since only the very 
                                                 
36 Ibidem, p. 26. 
37 Ibidem, p. 28. 
38 J. Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow), trans. D. Wills, “Critical Inquiry”, Winter 2002, 
Vol.  28,  No.  2,  p.  369-418;  see  especially  p.  408-409.    There  he  writes:  “This  agreement  concerning 
philosophical sense and common sense that allows one to speak blithely of the Animal in the general singular is 
perhaps one of the greatest, the most symptomatic idiocies [bêtises] of those who call themselves humans.” (p. 
409). 
39 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. B. Massumi, MA 1987, p. 249, [cited in:] J. Weinstein, 
Introduction..., p. 28. 
40 Nevertheless, as Weinstein (Introduction..., p. 28) argues in her article, Irigaray also speaks in favour of 
“becoming”. Yet, sexual difference theory, as it is commonly conceived, is basically concerned about fixed, pure 
entities. www.praktykateoretyczna.pl 
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small  (and  evolutionary  recent)  amount  of  species  is  “organised”  according  to  sexual 
difference. 
  To summarise, sexual difference as a concept in a Deleuzian sense is a “centre of 
vibrations”, it contains a logic. These are the reasons for which the concept as such already 
virtually contains the possibility of moving further and authentically breaking through the 
problem  of  Enlightenment  Humanism,  and  thus  arriving  at  a  fundamental  transspecies 
zoontology, which Weinstein calls “a robustly human transspecies transhumanism”
41, and I 
would call posthumanism. In the next part of this section I will scrutinise  Karen Barad’s 
proposition  of  agential  realist  ontology,  while  demonstrating  how  it  converges  with  the 
above-discussed  project  of  transspecies  zoontology,  constituting  thus  a  basis  for  the 
posthumanist theory. 
 
Agential realist ontology 
 
  For Karen Barad, ontology always already intertwined with epistemology and ethics 
forms the essential ground of her account of posthumanism. The latter for her is “about taking 
issue  with  human  exceptionalism  while  being  accountable  for  the  role  we  play  in  the 
differential constitution and differential positioning of the human among other creatures (both 
living  and  nonliving)”
42.  Hence,  a  characteristic  feature  defining  posthumanism  in  an 
opposition  to  humanism  and  antihumanism,  as  she  states,  is  its  integral  refusal  of 
anthropocentrism. Posthumanism “marks the practice of accounting for the boundary-making 
practices by which the »human« and its others are differentially delineated and defined”
43. I 
will attempt to explain it now. Barad formulates her definition of posthumanism as opposed to 
representationalism,  which  together  with  metaphysical  individualism  and  humanism  have 
been  haunting  our  thinking  up  till  now.  What  appears  to  be  foundational  for 
representationalism  is  the  notion  of  separation.  According  to  Barad,  representationalism 
“separates the world into the ontologically disjunct domains of words and things, leaving 
itself with the dilemma of their linkage such that knowledge is possible”
44. Posthumanism, on 
the other hand, does not “presume separateness of any-»thing«”
45, any pre-existing entities 
(including  humans). What  is  significant here,  is Barad’s account of  matter (as well as of 
                                                 
41 J. Weinstein, Introduction..., p. 29. 
42 K. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, 
Durham-London 2007, p. 136. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 Ibidem, p. 137. 
45 Ibidem, p. 136. Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
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difference),  which  is  always  agentive,  “not  a  fixed  essence  or  property  of  things”,  but 
“generated and generative”
46, always about differentiating and mattering (in its double, non-
univocal sense). I will get back to the issue of matter in the next sections of this paper. 
  In order to thoroughly scrutinise the questions of “ontology, materiality, and agency”, 
which appear to be essential for the issue of posthumanism, Barad proposes a posthumanist 
performative  approach.  The  latter  enables  “understanding  technoscientific  and  other 
naturalcultural  practices  that  specifically  acknowledges  and  takes  account  of  matter’s 
dynamism”
47. It is precisely because a performative account of discursive practices “insists on 
understanding thinking, observing and theorising as practices of engagement with, and as part 
of, the world in which we have our being”
48. Although one may immediately associate the 
notion of a “performative” approach with theories granting a great importance to the language 
(from  Austin’s  performative  utterances  to  Butler’s  performativity),  Barad’s  performativity 
goes exactly in the opposite direction, while contesting this great power granted to all forms 
of representation (e.g. language). A feature marking the difference  between posthumanist 
performativity and representationalist theorising (as she defines it) resides also in an optics 
that each approach assumes
49. Whereas representationalism (with its epistemology, a way in 
which we get to know the world) is characterised by the geometrical optics of reflection, 
posthumanist performative approach  functions along the physical optics of diffraction. As 
Barad argues, diffractive reading of theory, science studies and physics is like “the diffraction 
patterns  illuminating  the  indefinite  nature  of  boundaries  –  displaying  shadows  in  »light« 
regions and »bright« spots in dark regions – the relationship of the cultural and the natural is a 
relation of »exteriority within«”
50. Such a posthumanist reading, a posthumanist performative 
approach does not follow the line of distinct, pure, atomic (yet not existing in any sense – as it 
happens in various versions of representationalist thinking: from Cartesian epistemology to 
social constructionism) entities and realms of nature and culture, but think them together, 
intertwined, agential, differentiating, entangled. 
  Barad builds her own project of  an agential realist ontology (essential as a basis for 
the posthumanist theory), taking  as a point of departure (and consequently developing  it) 
                                                 
46 Ibidem, p. 137. 
47 Ibidem, p. 135. 
48 Ibidem, p. 133. 
49  We  can  find  the  same  distinction  of  optics  in  the  writings  of  Donna  Haraway,  e.g.  see:  D.  Haraway, 
Modest−Witness@Second−Millennium. FemaleMan−Meets−OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience, New 
York-London 1997. 
50 K. Barad, Meeting…,  p. 135. www.praktykateoretyczna.pl 
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Niels Bohr’s
51 philosophy-physics. What is crucial for Bohr’s theory is that “things” are not 
conceived  as  ontologically  basic  entities:  “things  do  not  have  inherently  determinate 
boundaries or properties, and words do not have inherently determinate meanings”
52. Not only 
does  he  pose  a  “radical  challenge”  to  Newtonian  physics,  but  also  to  the  Cartesian 
epistemological  structure  of  things,  knowers,  and  words,  as  Barad  states.  He  rejects  the 
transparency of both: language and measurement as well as the Cartesian distinction between 
the subject and the object
53. Although he breaks with the presumed fundaments of knowledge 
and  science  –  Newtonian  physics,  Cartesian  epistemology  and  atomistic  metaphysics  of 
Democritus, he proposes a new epistemological framework with the possibility of objective 
knowledge, which is based on the new discoveries in the field of quantum physics (that is an 
ultimately empirical domain). However, as Barad claims, one cannot find as full elaboration 
on the ontological issues as on his epistemology. That is why she examines this field very 
properly  herself,  arriving  at  an  agential  realist  ontology,  being  the  ground  for  her 
posthumanist performative account of both human and nonhuman material bodies. What this 
account examines and demonstrates is  
 
a  relationality  between  specific  material  (re)configuring  of  the  world  through  which  boundaries, 
properties, and meanings are differentially enacted (i.e., discursive practices,[...]) and specific material 
phenomena (i.e., differentiating patterns of mattering
54.  
 
In order to call such a causal relationship Barad uses the term of an “agential intra-
action”, as opposed to a commonly used notion of an “interaction”. “Intra-action” means that 
what is pre-existing (“ontologically primitive”) here is a relation (not relata), from which the 
relata emerge. It is precisely through intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the 
components  of  phenomena  are  being  constituted,  and  concepts  gain  their  meaning.  Bohr 
talked about phenomena as characterised by “the inseparability of the object and measuring 
agencies”
55. Drawing upon that, Barad claims that the basic ontological units are phenomena 
(and not distinct objects) defined as “the ontological inseparability/entanglement of intra-
acting »agencies«”.  
                                                 
51  Niels  Bohr  won  a  Nobel  Prize  as  an  author  of  a  quantum  model  of  the  atom  (being  one  of  the  first 
contributions to the development of the quantum physics). 
52 K. Barad, Meeting…, p. 138. 
53 Ibidem. 
54 Ibidem, p. 139. Italics in the original (also in the case of further quotations).  
55 Ibidem. Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
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  Nonetheless,  what  takes  place  (or  is  effected)  within    phenomena  during  ongoing 
agential intra-action is an “agential cut” between “subject” and “object”. What does it mean? 
Barad defines an “agential cut” as opposed to the well-known Cartesian cut, which means that 
entities (e.g. subject and object) are distinct from the very beginning. Concomitantly,  intra-
actions  ongoing  within  phenomena  and  effectuating  an  agential  cut  result  in  a  sort  of 
“exteriority-within-phenomena”, which is conditioned by the “agential separability”
56. Barad 
proposes a reformulation (or “reworking”) of a traditionally conceived notion of causality. In 
other  words,  “causes”  and  “effects”  are  not  pre-existing,  but  emerge  within  phenomena 
through the agential cut. That is why the possibility of objectivity is still valid. 
  Barad defines phenomena also as “differential patterns of mattering”. That means that 
they  emerge  through  the  agential  intra-actions  of  “multiple  material-discursive  practices”, 
which she also calls the “apparatuses of bodily production”. The latter are to be understood as 
boundary-making practices, “specific material (re)configuring of the world – which come to 
matter”
57. Although the above definitions seem quite difficult and abstract to comprehend, it 
is  precisely  through  such  complex  intra-actions  of  the  material-discursive  practices  (or 
apparatuses)  that  the  “boundaries  between  humans  and  nonhumans,  culture  and  nature, 
science and the social, are constituted”
58. What is new in Barad’s analysis of apparatuses and 
their specificity (in comparison to Bohr’s primary  version)  is twofold:  first, the  focus on 
discursive  practices  (and  not  on  linguistic  representations),  and  second,  it  is  through 
apparatuses as material-discursive practices that the distinction between nature and culture is 
enacted
59. Material-discursive practices appear, thus, as primary semantic units (instead of  
traditionally assumed words).  
  To complete Barad’s account of agential realist ontology, let us look at four significant 
definitions that she proposes. The first one is reality, which is always composed of “things-in-
phenomena”, not awaiting outside of or behind phenomena. The second – the definition of the 
world  as an open, dynamic process of intra-activity and materialisation (or mattering) in the 
effectuating  of  “determinate  causal  structures  with  determinate  boundaries”,  features, 
meanings, marks on bodies
60. Moreover, the space-time topologies of the world are changing 
along  the  ongoing  changes  of  the  dynamics  of  these  processes.  Thirdly,  Barad  equates 
dynamism and agency, which serves as a term for the “ongoing reconfiguring of the world”. 
                                                 
56 Ibidem, p. 140. 
57 Ibidem. 
58 Ibidem. 
59 Ibidem, p. 141. 
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Last, but not least, she defines the universe as the “agential intra-activity in its becoming”
61. 
Although this compounded elaboration on Barad’s concepts and particular and entirely new 
ways in which she defines traditionally approved notions may seem unnecessary, I find it 
exactly the other way round. It is only through such meticulous mapping and positioning the 
concepts, through defining them properly, and through drawing common points, alliances, 
looking for resonances that we will be able to acknowledge Barad’s agential realist ontology 
that forms a ground for a truly posthumanist account. 
  Karen  Barad’s  (and  Bohrian)  understanding  of  concepts  as  “specific  physical 
arrangements”
62 from which the meanings emerge as a result of agential cut thoroughly seems 
to  resonate  with  Deleuzian  and  Guattarian  idea  of  concepts  as  “centres  of  vibrations”, 
virtually containing the possibility of an event to come. Also Barad’s mattering converges 
with  Deleuzian  becoming,  as  well  as  her  horizontal  structure  with  apparatuses  ultimately 
corresponds with Deleuze and Guattari’s account of rhizomatic structure and assemblages, 
where both material and discursive are at place. I will explore common points between Barad 
and Deleuze and Guattari in the short section on matter in further parts of this article. 
  Nonetheless, both parts of this section devoted to the issue of ontology provided us 
with some deep insights on how the posthumanist ontology may look like. Moreover, both 
propositions (transspecies zoontology and agential realist ontology) complement each other in 
an  excellent  way.  Hence,  in  the  next  section  I  will  draw  upon  the  entwinement  between 
ontology,  epistemology  and  ethics  that  we  encounter  in  Karen  Barad’s  project  of 
posthumanism, as well as in other posthumanist-feminist theorists, such as Donna Haraway. 
 
Modes of knowing. The entwinement of ontology, epistemology and ethics 
 
  A  concept  which  is  crucial  for  our  understanding  of  the  intertwinement  between 
ontology and epistemology (artificially leaving ethics out of my analysis for a moment) is the 
concept of material-discursive practices (or apparatuses). Barad in her account mostly draws 
upon  Michel  Foucault’s  notion  of  discursive  practices  and  Niels  Bohr’s  concept  of  the 
apparatus, arriving at her own, posthumanist and agential realist formulation of discursive 
practices (or apparatuses)
63. She understands discourse in a Foucauldian sense, as that which 
                                                 
61 Ibidem. 
62 Ibidem, p. 139. 
63 Among other theorists and notions that resonate with and the traces of which one may find in Barad’s project, 
we should point out: Foucault’s dispositif (apparatus), Haraway’s apparatuses of bodily production, Latour’s 
inscription and translation, Butler’s performative, etc. – see: K. Barad, Meeting…, p. 141.  Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
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“constrains  or  enables  what  can  be  said”
64  and  what  finally  is  treated  (and  exists)  as  a 
meaningful statement. For Foucault discursive practices are “the local sociohistorical material 
conditions”,  which  enable  the  practices  of  disciplinary  power-knowledge.  Conditions  are 
acknowledged here as immanent, actual and “historically situated”
65. Such an understanding  
appears as the opposite to Kantian transcendental and  universally-valid ones. Moreover, it is 
through  these  historical,  immanent  conditions  that  subjects  and  objects  of  knowledge 
practices are produced. Barad points out moments in which Foucauldian account of discursive 
practices  converges  with  Bohrian  concept  of  the  apparatuses,  by  which  he  understood 
“particular, physical arrangements that give meaning to certain concepts to the exclusion of 
others; [...] the local physical conditions that enable and constrain knowledge practices such 
as  conceptualising  and  measuring;  they  are  productive  of  (and  part  of)  the  phenomena 
produced; they enact a local cut that produces »objects« of particular knowledge”
66. 
  Nonetheless, while reading Foucault and Bohr (as well as Judith Butler’s account of 
performativity and materiality, to which I will get back in the next section of this paper) 
through each other, Barad draws upon their failings or self-entrapments. 
  She aims at reworking the notions of discursive practices and apparatuses in such a 
way as to relieve them from the anthropocentric burden. One may find Bohr’s propositions – 
firstly,  that  the  apparatus  (which  had  been  previously  conceived  only  as  a  measuring 
instrument) plays a much more active role in the experimental practices, and secondly, that 
concepts are materially embodied, being a part of the apparatus – as almost revolutionary. 
Indeed,  Bohr’s  ideas  do  account  for  how  science  works  in  an  ultimately  new  way. 
Nonetheless, Barad points out in what way his perspective may (or even must) be pushed 
further in order to avoid his failings. Although Bohr aims at deepening and broadening the 
understanding of scientific practices, he finally overlooks the dynamic nature of scientific 
practices. Namely, he perceives the apparatus as constant, immutable, without rearrangements 
or alterations, as something fixed and bounded. Incidentally, Bohr “mistakes the apparatus for 
a mere laboratory setup”
67. Another thing is that in his account, human is implicated in the 
very  conditions  of  determinability  and  measurability
68,  and  thus  Bohr’s  stance  remains 
entangled in the liberal humanist theory of the subject. That is why Barad emphasises the 
need  for  a  posthumanist  perspective  on  the  apparatus,  the  role  of  the  human,  and  the 
                                                 
64 K. Barad, Posthumanist…,  p. 819. 
65 Ibidem. 
66 Ibidem. 
67 K. Barad, Meeting…, p. 144. 
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relationship that appear between them
69. Consequently, she proposes several developments to 
Bohrian  idea  of  apparatuses,  which  appear  as  specific  material-discursive  and  boundary-
making practices formative of matter and meaning; they are “material configurations/dynamic 
reconfiguring  of  the  world”
70.  In other  words, they  are  always  dynamic,  in  a  movement, 
generative  of  meaning,  of  subject  and  object  (which  are  co-consitutive),  without  intrinsic 
boundaries, they are not “in” the world, but “of” the world. 
  In  her  reading  of  Foucault  (and  following  his  concepts  Judith  Butler),  Barad  also 
remarks their humanist anthropocentric entanglement. Despite the emphasis on the production 
of meaning and bodies through specific (discursive practices), they remain concerned only 
with the production of human bodies, agency is only of a human domain, and thus, the nature-
culture binary is continued. Furthermore, they fail to provide an account of technoscientific 
practices and the profound impact they have on the production of the human bodies as well as 
the relations of power. Nonetheless, reading Bohr, Foucault, Butler and some other theorists 
through  one  another,  Barad  reformulates  the  concepts  of  both:  discursive  practices 
(understood  as  not  specifically  human-based  (re)configuring  of  the  world,  through  which 
boundaries,  properties  and  meanings  are  effectuated, or  – to  put  it otherwise  –  “ongoing 
agential causal intra-actions of the world”
71) and the apparatuses. The latter are also defined 
as boundary-making practices or “the material conditions of possibility and impossibility of 
mattering”. In other words, it is through apparatuses that both: entities (matter) and meaning 
(to matter = to mean) are produced. When speaking about agential intra-actions, she mentions 
“causality”, because due to “agential cut” (that I talked about in the previous section) there is 
a structure enacted within phenomena in which some components emerge as the “effects” and 
the other as the “causes”. Moreover, Barad constantly emphasises the ongoing dynamics and 
movement of discursive practices (apparatuses). What is extremely important here, is that she 
does not fix the boundary between human and nonhuman – they emerge from the phenomena 
through  material-discursive  practices,  they  are  mere  products,  not  substrates  or  points  of 
departure, “parts of the world in its open-ended becoming”
72. 
  I would  like to approach one of the  most  interesting  features of  her posthumanist 
performative perspective, namely her account of intelligibility and the nature of knowing. In a 
traditional  understanding,  “intellection”  and  “intelligibility”  have  been  always  defined  as 
uniquely  human  characteristics.  Nevertheless,  in  Barad’s  agential  realism,  intelligibility  is 
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70 Ibidem, p. 146. 
71 Ibidem, p. 149. 
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acknowledged as “an ontological performance of the world in its ongoing articulation”, its 
differential  becoming.  This  means  that  intelligibility  is  not  a  specific  human  feature. 
Furthermore, in this perspective, knowing is “a matter of intra-acting”; it entails “specific 
practices through which the world is differentially articulated and accounted for” as well as 
“differential responsiveness and accountability as part of a network of performances”
73. In 
this way, Barad’s posthumanist proposition goes beyond other (transhumanist, anti-humanist) 
challenges to humanism, because knowing is no longer an activity from the “outside”, enacted 
by a specific knowing subject (no matter how deconstructed or “enhanced”). In addition, she 
provides examples of nonhumans that appear as “partaking in the world’s active engagement 
in practices of knowing”
74. To put it once again, the “knower” is no longer external, outside 
of the world s/he attempts to understand, and  neither is s/he situated in a particular place in 
the world.  We are part of the world  in  its ongoing changes, reconfigurations, dynamics, 
production of meaning and entities (in “its ongoing intra-activity”), of “the world-body space 
in its dynamic structuration”
75. As Barad claims, practices of knowing and being are mutually 
implicated, not isolated from one another. Repeating the quote from Barad with which I have 
opened this paper: “we know because »we« are of the world. We are part of the world in its 
differential becoming”
76. Taking all that into account, Barad argues that the separation of 
epistemology from ontology is simply an inheritance of traditional metaphysics cutting off 
human from nonhuman, subject from object, mind from body, etc. (a sort of the “ontological 
hygiene”
77). That is why she proposes instead “the study of practices of knowing in being” – 
an  onto-epistemology.  The  production  of  meanings  is  always  already  entwined  with  the 
production of material boundaries  (or bodies).  
  However, she also points out the need for an adequate posthumanist ethics (since the 
broadly  acknowledged  humanist  ethics  does  not  suffice),  which  means  precisely  the 
accountability and responsibility for all relationalities that we (not only we – humans) engage 
in and are part of. 
 
Intra-acting responsibly as part of the world means taking account of the entangled phenomena that are 
intrinsic  to  the  world’s  vitality  and  being  responsive  to  the  possibilities  that  might  help  us  and  it 
                                                 
73 Ibidem, p. 149. 
74 Ibidem (Barad describes the instance of a brittlestar. See also: ibidem, p. 369-384). 
75 K. Barad, Posthumanist…,  p. 829. 
76 K. Barad, Meeting…, p. 185. 
77 The concept by Elaine L. Graham. See: E. L. Graham,  Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens 
and Others in Popular Culture, Manchester 2002. www.praktykateoretyczna.pl 
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flourish.  Meeting  each  moment,  being  alive  to  the  possibilities  of  becoming,  is  an  ethical  call,  an 
invitation that is written into the very matter of all being and becoming
78. 
 
Accordingly,  Barad acknowledges  values  as  integral to the nature of knowing and 
being. Objectivity connected with accountability appear as an epistemological, ontological 
and axiological issue. Since “[w]e are of the universe – there is no inside, no outside. There is 
only intra-acting from within and as part of the world in its becoming”
79. Hence, we arrive at 
ethico-onto-epistemology, which appears as a relevant account of the dynamic production of 
matter (of our becoming – related to ontology) and meaning (related to epistemology), both 
always already entwined with the issues of responsibility and accountability for the relations 
in their ongoing reconfigurings. 
  Although I have focused on Karen Barad’s posthumanist project, it is not only she 
who suggests the inherent connection  between the  material and the discursive, as well as 
ethics always already inscribed in these practices. We may find very similar traces in the 
propositions of Donna Haraway, famous for her concepts of situated knowledges
80 and the 
“material-semiotic”.  The  latter  means  that  bodies  as  objects  of  knowledge  are  not 
immediately present (that is they  are  not pre-existing), they are active, agentic,  meaning-
generative, their boundaries materialise in social interactions. Moreover, these boundaries are 
not  fixed,  they  may  “shift  from  within”
81.  Accordingly,  she  uses  the  term  of  situated 
knowledges in order to call the “embodied objectivity” with its specific, particular location 
and partial perspective. Only such a partial, embodied perspective may take full responsibility 
and accountability for and to  the object of knowledge, which is treated as “an actor and agent, 
not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally as slave to the master that closes off the 
dialectic in his unique agency and authorship of »objective« knowledge”
82. 
  In her most recent book When the Species Meet, Haraway refers to the notions of 
interference,  performativity  (so  specific  to  Barad),  multiplicity,  material  heterogeneity
83, 
when  she  explains  the  co-shaping  of  species
84,  the  reciprocal  complexity  of  their  co-
constitutiveness. What is extremely important in these knots of co-shaping is the “response 
                                                 
78 K. Barad, Meeting…, p. 369. 
79 Ibidem. 
80  See:  chapter  Situated  Knowledges  (p.  183-201)    in:  D.  Haraway,  Simians,  Cyborgs  and  Women:  The 
Reinvention of Nature, New York 1991.  
81 Ibidem, p. 201 
82 Ibidem, p. 198. 
83 D. Haraway, When the Species Meet, Minneapolis-London  2007, p. 41-42. 
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and respect”
85, the accountability and responsibility to and for each other. In addition, partners 
(relata) do not pre-exist the relation between them (their “constitutive intra-action”).  
  On the whole, both Haraway’s project and Karen Barad’s agential realism (I would 
call  both  propositions:  posthumanist)  resonate  with  each  other.  In  both  cases  ontology  is 
inherently  entwined  with  epistemology  as  well  as  ethics,  both  accounts  emphasises  the 
agentic  character  of  matter  and  the  importance  of  material-discursive  (material-semiotic) 
practices, also defined as apparatuses of bodily production. Although I cannot broaden this 
point further (due to limited space), I would like to remark a similar theme in Gilles Deleuze’s 
account of a monist and univocal ontology characterised by the “unity of the thing and the 
concept”
86. Together with Guattari, Deleuze claimed in What is Philosophy? that the question 
of philosophy is “the singular point where concept and creation are related to each other”
87. 
The  idea  of  the  connection  and  entwinement  of  ontology  and  epistemology,  though 
approached in a very specific way, stays behind their statement as well
88. 
  Having  thoroughly  analysed  the  posthumanist  account  of  ontology  –  both 
propositions: transspecies zoontology and agential realist ontology (in the first section of this 
paper) – as well as a specifically posthumanist relation between ontology, epistemology and 
ethics (namely, their entwinement – in the second section), I will proceed now to the question 
of the subject and its formation. As I argued in the introduction, I will briefly draw upon this 
issue, while focusing on two aspects: (1) what is the account of matter (and its dynamics, its 
formation)?, and (2) what is the account of relations – alliances? Moreover, I would like to 
remark that despite the wideness of the above questions, I will treat this section as a short, but 
necessary appendix to the main line of argument on the ethico-onto-epistemological structure 
of the posthumanist tool. In addition, as in the previous sections, I will pay special attention to 
Karen  Barad’s  theory  as  well  as  to  several  concepts  provided  by  Gilles  Deleuze,  Félix 
Guattari, and Donna Haraway. 
 
The formation of the subject. On matter and alliances 
 
  In  her  account  of  matter,  Karen  Barad  broadly  draws  upon  Judith  Butler’s  stance 
expressed  in  Bodies  That  Matter
89.  Although  Butler  understands  matter  as  a  “process  of 
                                                 
85 D. Haraway, When…,  p. 42. 
86 G. Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974), trans. M. Taormina, MA 2004,  p. 33. 
87 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 11. 
88 For a broader discussion on that issue, see: I. van der Tuin, R. Dolphijn. Pushing Dualism to an Extreme: On 
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materialisation that stabilises over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface 
we call matter”
90, and furthermore, as that which is already “fully sedimented with discourse 
on sex and sexuality that prefigure and constrain the uses to which that term can be put”
91, 
Barad points out her limitations. Namely, Butler’s matter appears to be a passive outcome of 
discursive  practices  much  more  than  an  agent  actively  taking  part  in  the  processes  of 
materialisation. Moreover, Butler’s theory remain intrinsically anthropocentric, being focused 
only on human bodies, and thus it reinscribes the nature/culture dichotomy. 
  What Barad proposes instead in her agential realistic approach, is a (going far beyond 
the anthropocentric confinement) account of matter as a dynamic “substance in its intra-active 
becoming – not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency. [...] a stabilising and destabilising 
process of  iterative  intra-activity”
92. It is a discursive production  in Barad’s posthumanist 
understanding of discursive practices that I talked about in the previous section. Barad speaks 
about mattering – the processes of materialisation (of boundaries) and meaning production at 
the same time – as “a dynamic articulation/configuration of the world”
93. She demonstrates 
how the material and the discursive are mutually implicated in this dynamics, while none of 
them  is prior in epistemological, nor ontological sense. In other words, she explains  how 
matter “comes to matter” – that is how it gets the meaning, which is already intertwined with 
the material boundaries which emerge in these dynamic processes. Material and discursive 
factors: constraints, conditions, practices, are always already con-joined. Consequently, both 
human and  nonhuman  bodies are (not pre-existent) material-discursive phenomena, which 
“come  to  matter  through  the  world’s  iterative  intra-activity”,  which  Barad  calls 
performativity. Traditionally (though, in different theoretical “wrappings”), matter has been 
considered  either  as  a  given,  or  as  a  discursive  construct.  Both  ways  have  been  simply 
reinscribing  the  binary  dichotomy  of  nature  and  culture  (with  all  its  implications).  Barad 
proposes an original and truly innovative account of materiality as dynamic processes, where 
agency is not attributed to the human subjectivity. Furthermore, agency is not a feature of 
subjects or objects in general, but it is rather understood as a “»doing«/»being« in its intra-
activity”
94 always related to the issue of responsibility and accountability for our intervening 
“in the world’s becoming”. Interestingly, Barad emphasises the fact that the constitution of 
human and nonhuman is always “accompanied by particular exclusions and always open to 
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contestation”
95. Again, it means that the boundary between human and nonhuman is not fixed, 
it  is simply  materialised  in the ongoing, dynamic processes (of  intra-actions), and always 
involves certain exclusions. 
  As I mentioned before, Donna Haraway also refers to the notion of performativity in 
the  posthumanist  understanding.  Her  account  of  matter  is  also  an  agentic  one  since  the 
material body is always already discursive, it is a “material-semiotic actor”. It is active in 
meaning-generating processes in which also its boundaries materialise. The matter and the 
body are thus the active agents. Haraway even uses the term of “world’s active agency”
96. 
Furthermore, when she speaks about co-constitutiveness of species (that I referred to in the 
previous section), she uses the term of “becoming with”
97. One more time the “mantra” of 
posthumanism that relata do not pre-exist relations is being repeated. 
  We may find the same theme in Deleuze and Guattari, who in their monist ontology 
speak rather about becoming than being, while emphasising the notions of fluid multiplicity 
(precisely, as our ontology – far beyond binary oppositions transposed on different levels, 
such as mind/body, human/animal, man/woman, subject/object, etc.) and deterritorialisation 
of  the  human.  The  latter  means  exactly  relinquishing  the  fixed,  pre-determined  boundary 
between human and nonhuman. Moreover, for Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is “a block of 
coexistence”
98. I would suggest that also in the sense proposed earlier by Haraway. According 
to their rhizomatic structure (of thought as well as of ontology as such), “[a] line of becoming 
is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes 
between points, it comes up through the middle”
99. It is precisely the formulation of primacy 
of relations with regard to entities between which these relations take place. 
  Deleuze  and  Guattari    demonstrate  also  how  becoming  is  not  organised  along  a 
vertical and hierarchical structure, such as that of evolution, where “filiation and “decency” 
are the key notions. Instead, they employ the notion of “alliance” as an important factor of 
becoming  and  that  of  the  domain  of  symbioses
100,  co-existence  and  co-constitutiveness. 
Although Haraway does not agree with Deleuze and Guattari at some points (for their lack of 
serious  attention  paid  to  “earthly  animals”
101),  the  notion  of  alliance  as  co-shaping  (of 
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companion species, but not only) and co-constitutiveness, works in her project in an excellent 
way. 
  What seems crucial then if one aims to talk about the posthumanist subject or rather 
subjectivity (I would argue, since it appears as a bit more dynamic) is that it always emerges 
from the set of changing, intra-active relations. Subjects and objects are constitutive of matter, 
they do not have fixed boundaries. As Haraway puts it, the relations are “the smallest possible 
patterns for analysis, the partners and actors are still-ongoing products. It is [...] how worlds 
come into being”
102. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  The  posthumanist  theory  appears  as  a  very  productive  tool  that  may  enable  us  to 
analyse the relations between humans and nonhumans and the complexity of the world we are 
living in generally. Birke, Bryld and Lykke provide us with an excellent example of such an 
analysis in their article on animal performances. Nonetheless, as I argued in the introduction 
to this paper, in order to use a theoretical tool, first one has to effectuate a precise mapping  of 
its coordinates. In the case of the posthumanist theory it appears as particularly important due 
to  the  blurring  of  concepts  often  associated  with  posthumanism.  That  is  why  I  defined 
precisely what I understand under the notion of posthumanism, while pointing out the task of 
going beyond humanist anthropocentrism as one of its main features. Moreover, I suggested 
four aspects through which I defined and analysed the posthumanist tool: modes of being (that 
is a posthumanist account of ontology – in the first section), modes of knowing (posthumanist 
entwinement of epistemology, ontology and ethics – in the second section), an account of 
matter and alliances (these two factors build the posthumanist perspective on the formation of 
the subject – in the third and last section).  
  In  the  first  section  I  drew  upon  Deleuze-inspired  Jami  Weinstein’s  proposition  of 
transspecies zoontology and Karen Barad’s agential realist ontology, while pointing out how 
they  complement  and  resonate  with  each  other.  Then  I  presented  how  the  production  of 
meaning and matter are always already intertwined, how the practices of knowing and being 
are always implicated in each other, and what is their relation to ethics, whilst suggesting the 
need for a specifically posthumanist ethics. In the last part I focused on Barad’s, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s  as  well  as  Haraway’s  accounts  of  matter  and  characteristics  of  realtion(ship)s. 
These insights lead directly to the question of the formation of subject. I would like to argue 
                                                 
102 Ibidem, p. 25-26. Praktyka Teoretyczna nr 1/2010 
  115
that the theorists I have analysed here manage to think the subject (or subjectivity) in a truly 
decentred, non-anthropocentric and posthumanist way. 
  The task of mapping and formulating the basic premises of the posthumanist tool has 
been thus fulfilled. In this way we gained indispensible insights that enable us to think the 
posthumanist  collective.  Yet,  it  is  only  the  first  step  to  question  and  imagine  a  truly 
posthuman(ist) politics. 
 
Marietta Radomska, Ku wspólnocie posthumanistycznej: ontologia, epistemologia, etyka. 
 
Abstrakt:  Celem  tekstu  jest  rekonstrukcja  podstaw  ontologicznych,  epistemologicznych  oraz  etycznych 
projektu posthumanistycznego (zwanego też teorią lub narzędziem posthumanistycznym) na podstawie analizy 
propozycji  teoretycznych  Karen  Barad,  Gillesa  Deleuze'a i  Felixa  Guattariego  oraz  Donny  Haraway.  Tylko 
dzięki tak precyzyjnemu zdefiniowaniu narzędzia teoretycznego możliwe będzie zadanie pytania o wspólnotę 
postludzką oraz posthumanistyczną politykę. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: posthumanizm, transhumanizm, wspólnota, Barad, Deleuze, Guattari, Haraway. 